

**Adrian Vatter, Christian Rüeßli, Daniel Schwarz and Michael Rheinegger:
„Kohärenz in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik.
Verwaltungskoordination am Beispiel der schweizerischen
Südafrikapolitik“ (Rüegger, 2005) (Research Credit: 200'065 Fr.)**

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**Translation of Title: Coherence in Swiss Foreign Politics. (An Example of)
Administrative Coordination Using (the Case of) Swiss Policies toward South Africa.**

Commentary

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by Martina Egli

*This study illustrates a core problem of several **projects of the Swiss National Science Foundation NFP42+ research programme**: They study the relationship between Switzerland and South Africa without considering the international context. As a result, I will consider this problem quite extensively. Vatter, Rüeßli, Schwarz and Rheinegger conducted interviews with contemporary observers but made their statements anonymous, which is a questionable approach both from a scientific and a political perspective. Yet, the study does give some insight into the “black box” of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Particularly interesting are the findings about **state secretary** Edouard Brunner, who almost single-handedly dictated South Africa policies. One wonders why this key (**power**) figure later disappears behind the scenes and is hardly ever mentioned in the synthesis by Georg Kreis.*

*In this study, the four political scientists use four case studies to investigate the decision and coordination processes within the Swiss **federal (oder government) administration** from 1985 to 1994: Human rights and transition policies, **positive measures**, diplomatic sanctions, and economic sanctions. They conclude that the policies of each area were mainly coherent and (at least at lower levels) coordinated. However, there was no overall coordination (joint strategy) between the different policy areas. Instead of a centralised coordination under the banner of a single department the principle of non-interference prevailed.*

The task of the study was in fact clearly formulated. “The aim is to place the history of the relations between Switzerland and South Africa in a longer term perspective. The focus should be on synchronous and diachronous comparisons in order to avoid a special case perspective (the Swiss relationship to South Africa has to be analysed in the international context)” (**untranslated original text in endnote**)¹: These recommendations were issued by the interdepartmental working group Switzerland-South Africa in their October 1999 report². The **Swiss National Science Foundation NFP42+ research programme** tasked with this study formulated its aim as: „(...) The projects should analyse the Swiss relationship to South Africa in an international context (...)“³.

Including the international context means that one has to ask: What was happening at the time in southern Africa? How and when did other (particularly Western) countries react to those events? The UN? Non-governmental stakeholders? All of these factors influenced Bern's strategies. If Switzerland's South Africa policies are not constantly compared to that of others - in other words **research conducted with a myopic view** - the following problems are the result (aside from the disrespect of explicit instructions): If the

50 researchers refrain from establishing the context before studying **Swiss records (oder**
documents, files), they will struggle to arrive at a comprehensive interpretation. In
particular, they may be unable to recognise the **records'** controversial nature. Without
further questioning, they also may accept the viewpoint of the role-players to be examined
55 (due to insufficient contextual knowledge). If the context is also omitted in the final
publication, the readers are unable to discover controversial issues or the unquestioned
adoption of a particular position.

The authors of the Vatter study analyse “Coherence in Swiss Foreign Politics”⁴ with a
minimal reference to the international context. The study thus dedicates only nine of the
60 nearly 400 pages to the “relevant political context”⁵ (p. 73). “Significant South African and
international events between 1985 and 1994”⁶ are discussed in a totally haphazard
chronology covering barely two pages. “Swiss positions on apartheid”⁷ take up another two
pages (p. 76f), and the remaining five pages are already dedicated to the “Foundations of
Swiss Foreign Politics”⁸ (p.78-81).

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Angola - the Largest Conventional War

Instead, there is the sentence on page 256 that South Africa was “at no time at war with
another country in the period studied between 1985 and 1994”⁹. **Come on, what’s the**
matter? Already in August 1975, still before Angola's independence, South African troops
70 pushed into Angolan territory with the CIA's support to aid UNITA, lead by Jonas Savimbi,
in the fight against the MPLA. The future ruling party was supported by Cuban troops. This
was a classic war by proxy of the Cold War era that intensified over the following years
and escalated in June 1987 – the midpoint of the time frame the Vatter study covers – with
the siege of Cuito Cuanavale to the then worldwide largest conventional war. The South
75 African attack on Angola (aside from the brutal suppression of the Soweto Uprising in 1976
and “ongoing aggression against neighbouring countries”¹⁰) was one of the reasons the
United Nations’ Security Council, for the first time in its history, imposed binding sanctions
on a member state in the form of an arms embargo based on chapter VII of the UN
charter. The reason was that South Africa's armament posed a “threat to maintaining
80 international peace and security”¹¹. The arms embargo remained the only binding UN
sanction against the apartheid state.

Thus, how does the Vatter study reach such a conclusion? Firstly, due to the lack of
context – and secondly, because it simply stipulates the Swiss government's position at
85 the time. In contrast, the human rights activist Jörg Künzli – who also completed a study
for the **NFP42+ research programme**¹² and, unlike Vatter, consulted the Swiss anti-
apartheid movement's documents and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Final
Report in addition to the **national archives** – not only discusses Angola in detail but also
reaches a completely different conclusion: “As extensively discussed, the Swiss view at
90 the time was that South Africa was not part of an international armed conflict, which is why
the administration's legal evaluation of the bilateral ties between Switzerland and South
Africa barely considered neutrality law. In my opinion, this view is hardly tenable in light of
South Africa's long-running armed conflict with Angola and its allies”¹³ (p. 355).

Anonymous Statements from Interview Partners

Some might credit Vatter for not specifically studying Swiss foreign policy but only its
coherence (Whenever is foreign policy ever coherent? Are human rights and economic
interests usually not opposites and thus incoherent?). Yet even if one takes this approach,
one cannot ignore the context – at the very least not the Swiss context. In addition to

100 studying the **national archives' documents**, Vatter also conducted interviews with contemporary witnesses. This makes sense. As the study's authors specify, written documents (**oder sources**) cannot conclusively answer certain questions; working hypotheses should also be re-examined by including interviews. Exactly this makes the topic so explosive: A considerable number of the key role players are still alive today.

105 The authors only interviewed (high ranking) officials in the **federal (government) administration** (and rather critical staff members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Tim Guldemann or Peter Maurer are missing on the list). The voices of **parliamentary and non (extra)-parliamentary key role players** are not heard. Furthermore, the
110 interviewees' statements are made anonymously. The study explicitly refers to interviewees in numerous places, with the bibliographic reference "**interview partner**". Although the appendix contains a list of all those interviewed in connection with the study, they do not have to stand by their statements. The **federal (government) administration representatives** under scrutiny in this study are allowed to anonymously explain, evaluate
115 and justify their policies in detail. This procedure is not only politically dubious (should a **state secretary as a public person** not have to stand by his actions and views?) but also scientifically questionable. The contents of anonymous testimonies cannot be trusted. One wonders to what extent personal actions are embellished, yet those of others criticised – a welcome opportunity to settle old scores. The reader searches in vain for a critical
120 commentary reflecting these concerns about the sources.

To explain this scientifically rather unusual procedure, Adrian Vatter says that interviewees made it clear they would only make controversial statements anonymously. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged the researchers to use this procedure by
125 making it the condition under which interviewees were released from the obligation of confidentiality.

"Strategy – that was Brunner"¹⁴

The anonymous interview statements do at least give some interesting insights into the "black box" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the study, the interviewees
130 "concurred in their statements that **state secretary** Brunner played the decisive and defining role: 'strategy' - that was Brunner" (p. 157) and: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy was made by the **state secretary**; he never asked anyone else."¹⁵ (p. 314, footnote 344). The **Political Division II (PA II)** as well as the Embassy in Pretoria were mainly content to implement Brunner's strategy, while Brunner had "a significant say"¹⁶ even in important operational decisions (p. 229). Unlike his subordinates,¹⁷ the "ubiquitous"¹⁸ **state secretary** is presented as an adamant Cold War supporter and anti-communist: "For Brunner, the Cold War embodied the core problem and the greatest threat to Western democracies. As a result, his foreign policy was orientated toward preventing the danger posed by expanding communism"¹⁹ (p. 167).

140 Vatter also uses written sources to substantiate Edouard Brunner's clear position, particularly a 14 May 1986 letter from the Swiss **state secretary** to the Swiss UN Observer, Ambassador Francesca Pometta. The letter can be described as a key document for understanding Switzerland's South Africa policy.²⁰ Vatter writes, "The **state secretary** further makes it clear that apartheid in South Africa is an isolated gross human
145 rights problem, but that from a global perspective and in terms of threats to Switzerland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' list of priorities was clearly secondary to the threat imposed by East European communist regimes: 'We equally have to assert that also

apartheid is reprehensible and immoral, (...) South Africa has no intention to export its system²¹ in contrast to other totalitarian states – and you know which states I mean – those with a clear expansionary and imperialist ideology and those we fear will intend to inevitably lead the entire world towards socialism and later towards communism, the states, which would not hesitate to use force (...) in order to attain their goal. There is a hierarchy in respect of dangers threatening us and we should not lose the sight of it”²² (p. 342).

In their desire to support change in South Africa, employees of the **Political Division II (PA II)** “occasionally circumvented (**by-passed**) Brunner and approached **Foreign Minister Aubert's personal assistant** (...), since he was more receptive to the anti-apartheid movement's arguments than Brunner”²³(p. 151f.). Apparently, Foreign Minister Aubert as well as the **DEH (today Swiss Development Corporation SDC)** initially also had to come up with more convincing arguments in favour of the “**positive measures**” programme²⁴ (cf. p. 200ff. and p. 220).

Dakar Conference „somewhat pointless“²⁵
State secretary Brunner also spoke out against – and this was not known until now – the financial participation of the Swiss government (i.e. the **DEH**, within the “**positive measures**” framework) at the July 1987 IDASA conference in Dakar (p. 209). His reasons were that the project was not transparent enough and without the participation of South African government representatives would be „**somewhat pointless**“. Vatter writes, “After a lot of persuasion by the **DEH**, the political director changed his mind”²⁶. In Dakar 61 Afrikaners, including academics, cultural representatives, clerics and business people, met with 17 leading ANC representatives. Both sides were consequently able to reject mutual stereotypes and prejudices²⁷. The conference participants released a statement demanding the release of all political prisoners as well as the legalisation of the ANC and all other political organisations. The apartheid regime was fuming about this meeting and reacted accordingly – and not only toward Switzerland. For the sake of brevity, I will just mention this. The Swiss financial contribution²⁸ toward the IDASA conference was criticised both by the South African government and within Switzerland because it was seen as ANC support. According to Vatter, this was the only time the apartheid government protested to the Swiss Ambassador in Pretoria and summoned him to the Foreign Ministry (p. 158). And in Bern there was also a formal South African **Demarche** at the **Political Direction II (PA II/Ministry of Foreign Affairs)** “in the hope that notice will be taken of South Africa’s misgivings”²⁹. The regime feared, according to Vatter, “the support of such conferences could³⁰ ‘encourage the ANC to continue its pressure, to suscite more violence, and to refuse negotiations’”³¹ (p. 158).

Bern should not become a Place of Pilgrimage for Opposition Politicians
In terms of direct contact with the ANC, as the Vatter study also shows, people were less daring. Probably in autumn 1986 (Vatter unfortunately does not give the exact date), Ambassador Jean-Olivier Quinche reported in a Telex to the **headquarters** in Bern, that the South African opposition criticised Switzerland's neutrality and viewed it as government support. As a result, Quinche suggested Bern should invite more opposition politicians (I quote Vatter, who quotes Quinche only indirectly) “on the one hand, to change their minds and to play a more active role, on the other hand to also moderate the influence of the churches and the anti-apartheid movement in Switzerland. The **Political Direction II (PA II)** thereupon encouraged the Embassy to comply with ‘the heightened information needs of headquarters’ and to ‘in the sense of the **Federal Council’s** 22

September 1986 explanation³² also maintain contact with opposition circles. However, they should not attract too much attention and particularly refrain from contacts with the banned ANC. The **Political Direction II (PA II)** is absolutely open to dialogue and is prepared to 'have contact with eminent and serious opposition representatives at an appropriate level in an appropriate form'³³. Bern should not, however, become a place of pilgrimage for opposition politicians³⁴ (p. 119f.).

Inaccurate Source and Time References

This study contains many interesting insights into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet the source references are very inaccurate even for written sources: The above example demonstrates this, as the reference is missing of who wrote this response to Quinche and when this telex transfer took place. The authors often only give the signature of the relevant **national archives dossier (file)**. As these are often quite extensive, it would be very time-consuming to find the relevant documents again, should one wish to conduct further research on the same topic. Furthermore, it is therefore also not possible for the reader to exactly figure out when particular events took place, even though the context would be relevant (**keyword context**).

It is also in several instances unclear on what (which source) a particular statement is based. For example, on p. 106 Vatter states, "The Swiss Embassy in Pretoria intensively monitored the human rights situation and was an important place to go for numerous South African NGOs, as well as lawyers and relatives of prisoners and those sentenced to death. Embassy staff had close contacts to these circles that allowed them to follow individual trials and court cases. They were able to report regularly to the **headquarters** in Bern with detailed information not only about the legislation and its application by the security forces and judicial authorities, but also on the situation in prisons, the penitentiary system and execution practices"³⁵. On what information is this statement based? And to what time period does it refer? In a publication co-written by this author on Swiss foreign policy toward the apartheid state³⁶, my co-authors and I arrived at contrary conclusions based on written and oral sources, at least for the period from 1981 to mid-1986. The Swiss Embassy's behaviour was also the subject of a 1986 enquiry by the then **National Councillor (Member of Parliament) Anita Fetz**³⁷. Our publication documented the case of a South African who was repeatedly imprisoned and tortured – yet the Swiss authorities refused to get involved citing scandalous reasons: "We could not fail to notice that an appeal on behalf of Father Farisani cannot be successful, since the South African authorities, with reference to the formal jurisdiction of the 'independent state' of Venda, refuse to accept protests in this case"³⁸. That was on 21 January 1987. Fortunately other governments were less concerned about whether the apartheid regime "accepts" protests. They protested all the same. And on 30 January 1987, Tshenuwani Simon Farisani was released³⁹.

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1 "Es gilt, die Geschichte der Beziehungen Schweiz-Südafrika in eine längerfristige Perspektive zu stellen und synchrone und diachrone Vergleiche anzustreben, um die Beschränkung auf eine Sonderfall-Optik zu vermeiden (das schweizerische Verhältnis zu Südafrika ist im internationalen Kontext zu analysieren)."

2 Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe Schweiz-Südafrika: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Südafrika, Bern, Juli 1999, Sperrfrist bis 1. Oktober 1999, p.92.

3 "(...). Die Projekte sollen (...) das schweizerische Verhältnis zu Südafrika im internationalen Kontext

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- analysieren (...).“
- NFP 42+, Beziehungen Schweiz-Südafrika, Broschüre, Bern, o.J., S.10.
- 4 “Kohärenz in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik”
- 5 “wesentlichen politischen Kontext”
- 6 “Zentrale Ereignisse in Südafrika und auf internationaler Ebene zwischen 1985 und 1994”
- 7 “Schweizerische Positionsbezüge zum Apartheidregime”
- 8 “Grundlagen der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik”
- 9 “zu keinem Zeitpunkt der Untersuchungsperiode 1985 bis 1994 in einem Kriegszustand mit einem anderen Staat befunden”
- 10 “anhaltender Aggressionen gegen die Nachbarstaaten”
- 11 “eine Bedrohung der Aufrechterhaltung des internationalen Friedens und der Sicherheit”
UN Security Council Resolution 418, 4.11.1977.
- 12 Jörg Künzli: Zwischen Recht und Politik. Der rechtliche Handlungsspielraum der schweizerischen Südafrikapolitik (1976-1994). Chronos, 2005.
- 13 “Wie oben ausführlich dargestellt, war Südafrika gemäss zeitgenössischem schweizerischen Verständnis nicht Partei eines internationalen bewaffneten Konfliktes, weshalb das Neutralitätsrecht in rechtlichen Evaluationen des bilateralen Verhältnisses Schweiz-Südafrika durch die Verwaltung kaum Beachtung fand. Diese Ansicht ist m.E. zumindest hinsichtlich der jahrelangen bewaffneten Auseinandersetzung Südafrikas mit Angola und dessen Alliierten kaum haltbar.”
- 14 “La stratégie, c’était Brunner”
- 15 “übereinstimmend zu Protokoll, dass Staatssekretär Brunner in der Gestaltung der schweizerischen Beziehungen mit Südafrika eine bestimmende and praegende Rolle einnahm: La stratégie, c’était Brunner und, “Die Politik im EDA wurde vom Staatssekretär gemacht; er hat nie jemanden gefragt”.
- 16 “ein gewichtiges Wort mitzureden”
- 17 “It is noticeable that neither PA II nor the human rights service or the Embassy in Pretoria named the ideology of anti-communism as a guiding principle in this context” (p. 343).
“(…) doch ist auffällig, dass weder von den PA-II-Akteuren noch vom Menschenrechtsdienst oder der Botschaft in Pretoria das kognitive Element des Anti-Kommunismus in diesem Zusammenhang als Orientierungspunkt genannt wurde (...).“
- 18 “omniprésente”
- 19 “Für Brunner stellte der Kalte Krieg ein Kernproblem und die grösste Gefährdung für die westlichen Demokratien dar. Seine Aussenpolitik war entsprechend darauf ausgerichtet, die Gefahr einer Expansion des Kommunismus zu verhindern.”
- 20 The first one to do so was Olivier Dinichert, in his [Lizenziatsarbeit](#) on positive measures: “Projekte mit einem gewissen Symbolgehalt’ - Die positiven Massnahmen der Schweiz in Südafrika 1986-1994“, Universität Bern, 2002
- 21 What about Namibia?
- 22 “(…). Der Staatssekretär machte des Weiteren deutlich, dass die Apartheid in Südafrika zwar ein gravierendes menschenrechtliches Einzelproblem darstellte, aus globaler Perspektive und aus dem Blickwinkel der Bedrohungslage für die Schweiz auf der EDA-Prioritätenliste jedoch klar hinter den kommunistischen Regimes Osteuropas rangierte: ‘Nous devons également constater qu’aussi condamnable et immoral que soit l’apartheid, (...) la République d’Afrique du Sud n’entend pas exporter son système alors que d’autres pays totalitaires - et vous savez à qui nous pensons - ont seulement une vocation expansioniste et impérialiste, mais conçoivent l’histoire comme devant inévitablement mener tout le monde au socialisme puis au communisme et n’hésitent pas à employer la force (...) pour arriver à leurs fins. Il y a là une hiérarchie des dangers qui nous menacent, que nous ne devons pas perdre de vue”
- Reply from [state secretary](#) Edouard Brunner to Ambassador Francesca Pometta, 14.5.1986.
Bundesarchiv E 2210.0 (-) 1998/7 Vol.11.
- 23 “gelegentlich Staatssekretär Brunner umgangen und sich direkt an den persönlichen Mitarbeiter von Bundesrat Aubert gewandt (...), da dieser den Argumenten der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung zugänglicher gewesen sei als Brunner.”
- 24 Persuasion was required, even later on - Vatter: “The **PA II** staff were convinced by the importance of the **positive measures** programme. They tried their best to promote it, that is to also defend their more progressive position in front of their bosses within the **Political Department (of the Foreign Ministry)**. Until the end of the 1980s (Brunner was [state secretary](#) until February 1989), they would use the strategy of first discussing their requests within the personal circle of the **Foreign Minister**, before informing [state secretary](#) Brunner” (p.224).
“Die Mitarbeiter der PA II waren überzeugt von der Wichtigkeit des Programms der positiven

Massnahmen und sie versuchten nach Kräften, diese auch zu fördern resp. die progressive Position auch innerhalb der PD (Politische Direktion des EDA) bei ihren Chefs zu vertreten. Dabei behalf man sich bis Ende der 1980er Jahre ((Brunner war bis Februar 1989 Staatssekretär)) gelegentlich auch der Strategie, das Anliegen zuerst mit dem persönlichen Umfeld des EDA-Vorstehers abzusprechen, bevor man Staatssekretär Brunner einweihete (Interviewpartner)“.

- ²⁵ “quelque peu inutile”
Letter by Brunner to the **DEH** on 25 May, 1987, Bundesarchiv E 2010 (A) 1996/397 Vol.375, cit. in Vatter, (p. 209).
- ²⁶ “Nach einiger Überzeugungsarbeit von Seiten der **DEH** konnte man den Politischen Direktor umstimmen.”
- ²⁷ Conference organiser Frederik van Zyl Slabbert sums Dakar up as follows: „Still, I think Dakar contributed to undermining a few defunct paradigms: it demystified the ANC, put paid to most of the stereotypes with which the South African regime had labelled it, and legitimised dialogue with the organisation“, in: Van Zyl Slabbert: *Tough Choices, Reflections of an Afrikaner African*, Cape Town 2000, (p. 61).
- ²⁸ Other countries and organisations also financed the conference.
- ²⁹ Bundesarchiv E 2010 (A) 1996/397 Vol.370, cit. in Vatter, P.158. An Embassy staff member also reported to the **headquarters** in Bern that Swiss involvement in connection with Dakar was seen very positively in South African opposition circles, and that Switzerland's image gradually improved due to this symbolic gesture: Bundesarchiv E 2010 (A) 1996/397 Vol.380 and Vatter, (p. 131).
- ³⁰ “die Unterstützung derartiger Konferenzen könnte”
- ³¹ Bundesarchiv E 2010 (A) 1996/397 Vol.370, cit. in Vatter, (p.158).
- ³² In this explanation, the Bundesrat amongst other things declared its view, “that it was necessary to maintain dialogue with both the South African government and the representatives of other interested parties.” (in Vatter, p.77, the explanation is printed in the exact wording).
„es als notwendig, den Dialog sowohl mit der südafrikanischen Regierung als auch mit den Vertretern der anderen interessierten Parteien aufrechtzuerhalten.“
- ³³ Bundesarchiv E 2200.178 (-) 2000/45 Vol. 8, cit. in Vatter, S. 119f. Vgl. and Vatter, (p.124): “Bern warned Ambassador Quinche several times no to attract too much attention and particularly to make no contact with the ANC, which was banned in South Africa.”
„Botschafter Quinche wurde aus Bern mehrmals ermahnt, sich nicht zu sehr zu exponieren und insbesondere keine Kontakte zum in Südafrika verbotenen ANC zu unterhalten.“
- ³⁴ “einerseits ihre Meinung zu korrigieren und eine aktivere Rolle zu spielen, andererseits aber auch den Einfluss der kirchlichen Kreise und der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung in der Schweiz zu relativieren. Die PA II ermunterte daraufhin die Botschaft, dem ‚erhöhten Informationsbedürfnis der Zentrale‘ zu entsprechen und ‚im Sinne der Erklärung des Bundesrates vom 22. September 1986‘ Kontakte auch zu oppositionellen Kreisen zu pflegen. Sie solle sich aber dabei nicht unnötig exponieren und insbesondere auf Beziehungen mit dem verbotenen ANC verzichten. Die PA II zeige durchaus Gesprächsbereitschaft und sei bereit, ‚mit eminenten und ernstzunehmenden Vertretern der Opposition auf geeignetem Niveau und in geeigneter Form weiterhin Kontakt zu haben.‘ Bern sollte allerdings nicht zu einem Wallfahrtsort für Oppositionspolitiker werden.“
- ³⁵ “Die schweizerische Botschaft in Pretoria betrachtete die Menschenrechtssituation in Südafrika intensiv und war eine wichtige Anlaufstelle für zahlreiche südafrikanische NGOs, Anwälte und Angehörige von Gefangenen und zum Tode Verurteilten. Mit diesen Kreisen pflegten die Botschaftsmitarbeiter enge Kontakte, was ihnen erlaubte, individuelle Verhandlungen und Gerichtsfälle direkt zu verfolgen und die Zentrale in Bern regelmässig mit detaillierten Informationen nicht nur über die Gesetzgebung und ihre Anwendung durch die Sicherheitskräfte und Justizbehörden, sondern auch über die Situation in Gefängnissen, den Strafvollzug und die Hinrichtungspraxis zu versorgen.”
- ³⁶ Martina Egli, Mascha Madörin, Barbara Müller and Susi Richner: *Diskrete Diplomatie als Alibi. Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik gegenüber der Apartheid. ZeitzeugInnen erinnern sich. Apartheid Connections 1*, Hg. von der Recherchiergruppe Schweiz-Südafrika, Zürich, Oktober 2000. cf. Particularly chapters 1 and 2
- ³⁷ 86.516. Interpellation Anita Fetz: Südafrika. Diplomatisches und politisches Verhalten der Schweiz. 19.6.1986.
- ³⁸ “Wir können nicht umhin, festzustellen, dass einem Appell zugunsten von Pfarrer Farisani kein Erfolg beschieden ist, da sich die südafrikanischen Behörden unter Hinweis auf die formelle Zuständigkeit des ‚unabhängigen Staates‘ Venda weigern, Proteste in diesem Fall entgegenzunehmen.”
Alfred Rüegg, Chef der politischen Abteilung II des EDA, an Hans Walter Huppenbauer, Generalsekretär der Kooperation Evangelischer Kirchen und Missionen (KEM), 21.1.1987. In: Egli et al., *Diskrete Diplomatie als Alibi*, S.31-34.
- ³⁹ Further pressure from the West was necessary until the regime gave the priest an exit visa. Together with

his family, Farisani flew to the US, where he spent six months in a Minnesota center for torture victims. cf. Egli et al, p.34.